Translated by Conan Rainwater, SJ
In July of 2011, I commented in the Chilean Jesuit magazine, Mensaje, concerning the development of the electoral process that brought Ollanta Humala to power (2011–16) and the significance of that victory for Peru. Today I see that what I wrote ten years ago is still valid, because what these most recent elections show us is that the Peruvian social structure has basically not changed and that the coronavirus pandemic has only exacerbated the economic, social, and institutional gaps that the country has been suffering since the foundation of the republic 200 years ago.
What, however, would be new? I would say that, assuming the figures offered by the electoral authority, a candidate so far removed from the urban-capitalist society has never been elected president of the country. And what is also a novelty, at least during these two decades of democratic life, is the level of violence against government institutions triggered by the rejection of the economic and political elite in Lima to the figure of Pedro Castillo.
GAPS IN EVIDENCE
Effectively, despite efforts of social inclusion that Humala himself promoted during his governance, Peru continues being a very unequal country, and the pandemic has made this evident. More than 70% of consumer buying and selling takes place informally, with the level of labor and social vulnerability that this generates. More than 60% of those who live in rural zones have no access to internet, even in our age when all the education systems function virtually. And, according to the figures released by the current government, Peru registers a very high rate of mortality due to Covid-19 (500 deaths for every 100,000 inhabitants) which speaks of the precariousness of its government health system which is overwhelmed by the demand for oxygen and ICU beds generated by the pandemic. As for the rest, what Peruvian from the poorer sectors of the population has not shared the desperation of an acquaintance, if not a close relative, faced with the impossibility of finding oxygen to keep on living? That is the magnitude of the tragedy in the midst of which these parliament and presidential elections have taken place.
However, there is also another phenomenon that has been present during the last ten years ago and that has only been getting worse: the precarious of the country’s democratic institutions. The crisis of the political parties has a long history in Peru. It is enough to consider that the only traditional political party that has obtained the presidency in the last thirty years is the American Revolutionary People’s Alliance [Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, APRA] of Alan García (1985-1990 and 2006-2011). But now that party does not even have enough members to be able to participate in the elections. For their part, Popular Action [Acción Popular], the party that brought Fernando Belaúnde to power twice (1963-1968 and 1980-1985) and that seemed to be reborn by obtaining the biggest caucus in the last Congressional period, lost legitimacy when their parliamentarians forced the constitutional order to remove President Martín Vizcarra in September of 2020 and replace him with Manuel Merino, who would be defenestrated a week later.
The crisis of the major parties has given rise to the constant emergence of small groups formed for the sole purpose of obtaining power in the immediate future. This phenomenon began in 1990 when Change 90 [Cambio 90] was created by Alberto Fujimori. In the most recent elections, eighteen such parties participated, and they included Free Perú [Perú Libre] whose candidate, Pedro Castillo was elected president.
In the majority of cases, these groups exist without a solid political ideology and are sustained by individualistic leaderships – which is basically to say by the leadership of political dictators [caudillistas] – and openly populist programs. Once the executive or legislative power has been achieved, these parties prove incapable of reaching consensus for reforms to optimize the democratic system, because their only aim is the desire to preserve their own share of power. And their goal is to preserve their own economic interests and also control the judicial structures to avoid jail. And that is how the principal democratic institutions finds themselves at the mercy of immediate objectives which make ethical goals invisible and place Peru in a permanent state of anxiety.
A COUNTRY CAUGHT BETWEEN TWO FIRES
The characteristics of the last electoral process are, without a doubt, direct consequences of the aforementioned gaps. In the first round, no less that eighteen political groups presented presidential candidates, among which only two had a party tradition. As a consequence of the election laws, Pedro Castillo and Keiko Fujimori went on to the second round, each one with less than 20% of the votes. In other words, they achieved this more by the absence of a unifying candidate than by their own electoral strength. However, the dissimilarity of the positions of both candidates led to massive support for both Castillo and Fujimori, which, as had already happened in 2011, were more the result of a rejection of the opponent than a true identification with the chosen candidate.
Castillo, who probably never imagined getting to the second round, ran on an anachronistic socialist program drawn up by the founder of his party, Vladimir Cerrón, a former regional governor convicted of corruption in 2019. Fujimori, for her part, claimed the success of neoliberal policies in Peru’s economic recovery, while continuing to be prosecuted for corruption and for exhibiting a team with few democratic credentials. It was to a certain extent predictable that the underprivileged sectors, those who suffer the most from the effects of the pandemic, and the citizens critical of the corrupt and undemocratic tradition of Fujimorism, would mainly opt for Castillo. And it was also predictable that the emerging and well-to-do sectors, guardians of the current economic model and distant from the socialistic regimens of the region, would prefer Fujimori.
What has been surprising is the level of polarization produced by the political debate in all areas of social life (in the family, work, in Church, etc.). This discussion had the unbridled space of social networks as its privileged scene. Although it is not surprising, the racist violence that has arisen among the white and urban populations of the country, fundamentally against the candidate Castillo and his followers, has been shocking. Hence, today, after the elections, we find ourselves with a country which is deeply divided, certainly between two electoral options, but even more basically between two different world views of both its history and the its future.
IN THE UNCERTAINITY, HOPE?
What does the eventual triumph of Pedro Castillo mean for Peru today? If Castillo was able to prevail over Fujimori, even if only by a small margin, that is basically due to two factors. First, the broad public rejection of Keiko Fujimori’s political behavior in recent years, characterized by her permanent hostility to the executive and judicial institutions in Congress. And, secondly, the feeling of exhaustion produced by a multi-million-dollar Fujimorist campaign, which enjoyed the backing of the mainstream media and the influencers in both entertainment and sports, and which made the specter of communism a permanent tool of intimidation. Therefore, one can say that the triumph of Castillo expresses the resistance of an electorate which not only demands economic inclusion, but is also aware of the importance of putting a limit to forces which represent both the corruption and classism in the country.
In a real way, Castillo’s triumph which surged in the second round shows that the society of privileges and groups of power that Peru has lived during these last two hundred years of republican life is not enough.
However, Pedro Castillo who began as a radical Marxist candidate has had to constantly improvise his government proposals; the candidate who remains under the shadow of the radical Vladimir Cerrón who was convicted of corruption, and the candidate who, even in the sector that voted for him to block Fujimori’s path, continues to generate doubts and uncertainties.
Now that he has officially been proclaimed President, it is very likely that, supported by the technical team of the former candidate Verónica Mendoza [president of the political movement New Peru (Nuevo Perú) since December of 2017], he will want to carry out a leftist economic program; basically the same program that Humala promised to accomplish ten years ago but was unable to accomplish. However, if he wants a sustainable government, his first task will be to promote the unity between these two halves of the country that today mutually criticize each other, sometimes with open violence.
Castillo will govern with the constant threat of a Congress from where the Fujimorism and right-wing forces will try to bring him down at the first opportunity. In addition, he will have to deal with the pressure from a Lima economic elite that resents not having had the same access to him as they had with Humala. He will be able to count on an active citizentry, mobilized again since the impeachment of the former president, Vizcarra, who will watch over him, but will also defend him if they feel acknowledged by his actions.
Castillo must be very conscious that he has not won the election by virtue of an ideological program, but rather from a long-delayed demand of democratization. And he should also be conscious that he carries with him the hopes of recognition of a large part of those who do not live in Lima but rather in rural Peru.
Finally, if he knows how to invite people who can help him understand the political process well, the fact that a humble school teacher is leading the country at the beginning of its third century of the republican life will not cease to be a hopeful sign for democracy in Peru.
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Publicado en castellano en Mensaje (Chile, Vol. 70, Nº. 700, Julio 2021, págs. 15-17)
políticamente creyente 